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Carbon Sequestration Policy and Global Warming
A Legal Analysis
Norman W. Thorson∗
Introduction
Global warming seems destined to become one of the defining issues of the
twenty-first century. Most scientists now agree that measurable increases in average
global mean temperatures over the past decades cannot be explained by natural temporal
variations in the earth’s climate. Instead, global warming appears to be a fact that can be
attributed to human induced changes in the composition of greenhouse gasses in the
earth’s atmosphere. Moreover, if the trend toward ever increasing temperatures
continues, consequences for the earth’s environment will be dramatic, and perhaps
irreversible. Growing concern over the potential for human activities to alter the earth’s
climate has precipitated a flurry of proposals designed to address the problem. Most
notably, an international agreement to address the issue, the Framework Convention on
Climate Change,1 was adopted in 1992. That agreement, and the fact that it has been
signed and ratified by most nations on earth, including the United States, is testament to
the significance and seriousness of the issue.
The Greenhouse Effect and its Vulnerability to Human Induced Changes
Earth’s climate is warmed and moderated by gases in the atmosphere that trap the
sun’s heat, notably water vapor and carbon dioxide. These gases allow radiant energy
from the sun in the form of visible light to pass through and reach the earth’s surface
where it is converted into heat. Some of this heat is reflected from the earth’s surface in
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the form of infrared radiation. Certain gasses, including carbon dioxide, absorb a portion
of this heat energy and reradiate it back toward the surface of the earth, much as a
greenhouse allows sunlight to enter and heat the interior, but where the roof and walls
retain the heat. The greenhouse effect is critical to maintaining life on the planet. Absent
greenhouse gasses, heat energy would be reflected back into deep space and average
planetary temperatures would be some 60 degrees Fahrenheit colder than they are today.
That so-called greenhouse gases play a significant role in moderating earth’s
climate is not a recent scientific development. The ability of certain atmospheric gasses
to form a heat-retaining dome around the planet was first hypothesized by the noted
chemist Fourier. Fourier began musing about the ability of the planet to retain heat when
he accompanied Napoleon’s forces to Egypt in 1798, and he had fully developed his
theory by 1820.2 The greenhouse effect was thus discovered coincident with the advent
of the industrial revolution in Europe.
Not only is the greenhouse effect a principle long accepted by science, but the
possibility that the climate might be warmed as a consequence of burning fossil fuels
also is not a new scientific theory. In 1896, the Swedish chemist and Nobel Prize winner
Arrhenius first advanced the theory that carbon dioxide emissions from the combustion of
coal could cause the earth’s climate to warm.3 Building on the work of Fourier,
Arrhenius noted that combustion of coal and other fossil fuels releases large amounts of
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Since carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas, Arrhenius
2

When he returned to France in 1801, he began to develop theories to describe the movement of heat
within a body and at the boundary of a body. By 1820, he had turned his attention to the question of why
the earth remained warm enough to support life. Why wasn’t heat generated by the suns rays lost after
being reflected off the surface of the earth? Fourier hypothesized that certain atmospheric gasses acted as
an invisible dome that absorbs some of the heat reflected from the surface and reradiates it back downward
again. See generally G. CHRISTIANSON, GREENHOUSE 1-12 (1999).
3
Id. at 105-115.
3
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hypothesized that humans might alter the earth’s climate by burning fossil fuels such as
coal.4
Greenhouse gases whose concentrations can be affected by human activity are
known as anthropogenic greenhouse gasses. Carbon dioxide is the most significant
anthropogenic greenhouse gas.5

It is the potential impact of humans to alter the

concentration of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere that is the subject of current
concern. Today, there is no dispute about the fundamental science of heat retention and
reflection by atmospheric gasses. Nor is there any dispute that the concentration of
greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere has been increasing. Measurements taken on
Mauna Loa in Hawaii and from polar ice cap samples confirm that the concentration of
greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere has increased dramatically over pre-industrial
revolution levels.6 Moreover, a growing mountain of evidence suggests that the earth’s
climate is beginning to heat in response to these increased concentrations of greenhouse
gasses.7

4

Although Arrhenius correctly hypothesized that the release of greenhouse gases through human activity
could lead to global warming, he seriously miscalculated the rate at which greenhouse gases would
accumulate in the atmosphere. His estimated that it would take 3,000 years for carbon dioxide
concentrations in the atmosphere to double, a level now expected to be reached by the middle of the twenty
first century. Id. at 115.
5
Other significant anthropogenic greenhouse gasses include methane (NH4), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and
chlorofluorocarbons (CFC’s). In addition, three trace gasses (hydrofluorocarbons (HCFC’s),
perfluorocarbons (PFC’s), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)) would also be subject to regulation under the
Kyoto Protocol. Historically, carbon dioxide has been viewed as the most significant anthropogenic
greenhouse gas. CO2 emissions are expected to contribute approximately 50 percent of the increase in
global temperatures expected during the next 60 years. J. Justus & S. Fletcher, IB89005: Global Climate
Change, (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2001).
6
Concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere have increased by about one-third during the last one
hundred years. Id. This concentration is higher than at any time during the previous 420,000 years.
7
Global average surface temperatures increased approximately .6° C. during the twentieth century, and is
expected to warm another 1.4 to 5.8° C by the end of the twenty first century. See WORKING GROUP II OF
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION,
AND VULNERABILITY 3 (2001). Although these numbers seem small, the planet would be warmer than it
has been since the age of dinosaurs. Similarly, cooling of the same magnitude would trigger another ice
age.
4
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The consequences of global warming are somewhat speculative, but potentially
severe. Among the possible impacts of global warming are rises in ocean and sea levels,
altered marine ecosystems, destruction of coral reefs, spread of disease vectors, especially
for insect born infectious diseases, more intense and severe weather patterns, regional
changes in agricultural production potential, altered patterns of precipitation and other
changes in the hydrologic cycle, increased desertification, increased forest loss, and
substantial loss of biodiversity.8 Moreover, small changes in average temperature can
have a dramatic impact.9 Atmospheric chemistry, however, is exceedingly complex. In
particular, the capacity of the planet to adapt to increasing concentrations of greenhouse
gasses is not clearly understood. Global warming, for instance, can be expected to
increase cloud cover. Water vapor in clouds is itself a greenhouse gas that contributes to
global warming. At the same time, enhanced cloud cover exerts a cooling effect by
preventing some of the sun’s radiant energy from striking the surface of the planet.
Determining the precise impact of these, and other, feedback loops is a matter of
continuing study.10
Implications of the Carbon Cycle
Carbon is an essential element for all life on earth. It is found in the atmosphere
in various forms; it is dissolved in the oceans; and it is a major component of many soils
and rocks. Carbon is cycled continuously through the biosphere, the atmosphere, the

8

See generally, e.g., D. HUNTER, J. SALZMAN, & D. ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW &
POLICY 616-621 (1998).
9
See generally, id. at 9-17.
10
Complexity is also illustrated by trying to determine the effect that regulating CFC's will have on global
warming. The use of CFC’s is banned by international agreement because these substances precipitate the
destruction of stratospheric ozone. Ozone is another greenhouse gas, however, as are CFC’s.
Consequently, the elimination of CFC’s is likely to affect the concentration of greenhouse gasses in the
atmosphere, but in ways that are difficult to predict with great accuracy. Banning CFCs will reduce one
greenhouse gas overtime, but eventually it will lead to the accumulation of another greenhouse gas.
5
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soils and the oceans as a result of natural forces. Understanding the carbon cycle is
essential to understanding the causes and cures of climate change.
The atmosphere is a critical part of two carbon cycles, which distribute a
chemical raw material required by all living organisms. In the shorter
cycle carbon is fixed in green plants and in certain microorganisms, such
as algae, through the process of photosynthesis. This process takes place
when sunlight is absorbed by chlorophyll, which powers a process that
breaks down CO2 from the atmosphere to form organic molecules, such as
glucose and amino acids, that accumulate in the biomass of the plants.
Animals, which are not capable of photosynthesis, obtain the carbon they
need to produce energy for maintaining their bodily processes by eating
plants or other animals that are the primary or secondary consumers of
plants. Carbon is returned to the atmosphere in the form of CO2 through
the cellular respiration of living plants and animals and their
decomposition upon death. The carbon in vegetation is also released to
the atmosphere when it's burned, as in forest and range fires or slash-andburn farming. The oceans absorb and release vast quantities of CO2 and
thus serve as a buffer that keeps the level of CO2 in the atmosphere
relatively stable.
There is also a geological carbon cycle that takes place naturally on a
much longer scale of time. The cycle begins when organic material from
plants and animals slowly becomes locked into sedimentary deposits,
where it may remain for hundreds of millions of years in the form of either
carbonates contain the shells of marine organisms or organic fossils, such
as coal, oil, and natural gas. Some of the carbon is eventually released
when the geological formations in which it is locked are exposed to
weathering and erosion. Human beings have greatly accelerated the
release of this carbon by mining and drilling large quantities of fossil fuels
and burning them to produce energy while in the process emitting CO2.11
One implication of the carbon cycle is that humans can alter the natural flows of
carbon through the carbon cycle in a way that causes a disproportionate amount of carbon
to be stored in the atmosphere, thereby accentuating the greenhouse effect. The principle

11

M. SOROOS, THE ENDANGERED ATMOSPHERE 31 (1997).
6
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human activity that alters the carbon cycle in a way that increases carbon dioxide
concentrations is the combustion of fossil fuels.12
A second implication of the carbon cycle is that atmospheric concentrations of
carbon also can be affected by activities, such as deforestation, that reduce the capacity of
the planet to absorb additional greenhouse gasses. Tropical rain forests, for instance,
have the capacity to capture and remove significant quantities of carbon from the
atmosphere storing it in vegetation. Processes and mechanisms capable of removing
greenhouse gases from the atmosphere are known as sinks. Converting tropical rain
forests to farmland eliminates the carbon sink and, if the forest is burned, releases
additional CO2 to the atmosphere. Alternatively, if the wood residue is allowed to decay,
another greenhouse gas, methane, will be released to the atmosphere from termites that
assist in the decomposition process. Other human activities that contribute to increased
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere include various agricultural
cropping practices, the production of livestock, and the use of internal combustion
engines.13
Although the primary focus of this paper is on carbon, other anthropomorphic
gases play a significant role in global warming.14 Greenhouse gasses vary in their global
warming potential and in their persistence. Carbon dioxide, the most important by
volume, is less potent than other gasses. Methane has 56 times the global warming

12

Energy related activities are the primary source of man-made greenhouse gas emissions, representing
about 85 percent of the total man-made carbon emissions in the United States in 1998. National Energy
Policy Development Group, Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s
Future 3-10 (Report to the President of the United States submitted May 16, 2001).
13
Tillage practices affect the release of carbon from soil; livestock are significant source of methane; and
internal combustion engines release nitrous oxides, another greenhouse gas.
14
Six greenhouse gases are identified and regulated under international agreements that address climate
change. A seventh, CFC’s, are regulated under international agreements that regulate ozone depleting
substances.
7
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potential of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxides have 280 times the global warming potential
of carbon dioxide, and CFC’s have global warming potential thousands of times greater
than that of carbon dioxide. Despite its relative lack of potency, carbon dioxide is
thought to be responsible for at least 50 percent of the global warming attributable to
man-made sources. Greenhouse gasses also vary as to how long they persist in the
atmosphere. Carbon dioxide, for instance, has an atmospheric life of 50 to 100 years. In
contrast, methane persists for only 12 years, but some other anthropogenic greenhouse
gases may persist for thousands of years. The differences in persistence and global
warming potential of the various greenhouse gases have important policy implications.
First, a common unit of currency must be found. To account for varying potencies, it is
common practice to refer to greenhouse gases in terms of carbon equivalents. Second,
persistence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere means that the climate is currently
affected by activities that occurred generations ago and stabilizing greenhouse gas
emissions will not prevent the further buildup of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere.
Current Legal Framework
General Background
Regulation of greenhouse gases is still in a nascent state. The regulatory
challenge is complex because climate change is a global problem. The problem also is
complex because anthropogenic greenhouse gases are emitted as a consequence of
activities that generally are conceded to be essential to economic development.
Furthermore, the problem is complex because greenhouse gas emissions are widely
scattered across the planet.

8
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The fact that climate change is a global issue means that no nation can capture the
benefits of regulation for its own citizens absent cooperation of the international
community. A nation has no incentive to engage in costly regulatory programs if the
purported benefits of the program can be thwarted by another nation that increases its
emissions of greenhouse gases. Conversely, even if general international cooperation is
achieved, relatively small emitters have an incentive to eschew costly regulatory
measures because they can benefit from the collective action of others without having to
bear any of the costs of those actions, a classic free-rider problem. Finally, the impacts of
global warming are not spread equally across the planet. Some low-lying island nations
face the prospect of becoming submerged if sea levels rise even modest amounts. On the
other hand, some nations would probably benefit from global warming in the short run as
growing seasons and precipitation patterns change. The problem is one that cannot be
resolved without achieving general consensus, but general consensus will be
extraordinarily difficult to achieve.
The fact that greenhouse gas emissions are associated with economic activity
means that the cost of greenhouse gas abatement likely will be significant. It also brings
into sharp focus the differences between the developed world and the developing world.
The world’s developed economies are highly dependent on energy consumption, much of
it derived from fossil fuels. Developing countries are poised to greatly increase their
consumption of energy, and hence their contribution of greenhouse gases to the
atmosphere, as they strive for economic equality with the developed world. Developing
nations like China have an enormous potential to increase emissions of greenhouse gases
as their economies grow; understandably, such nations are unwilling to forgo growth to

9
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contribute to a solution to a global warming problem that they see being caused largely
by consumption of energy in the developed world. Other developing nations see their
economic future tied to conversion of forest land to agricultural land, much as occurred
previously in Europe and North America. This potential loss of sinks has the same
impact as increasing emissions from burning fossil fuels. Still other nations have
economies that are almost entirely dependent on providing the fossil fuels that fuel the
development of the world, but which cause so much of the buildup of greenhouse gasses
in the atmosphere.
Finally, the fact that greenhouse gas emissions are widely dispersed across the
planet means that one cannot achieve success solely by forging an agreement between the
10 or 12 largest emitters, particularly when so many developing countries have the
potential to greatly increase their contribution to the buildup of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere. The international agreements that have been negotiated to date, and the
national programs that have been proposed, are all of recent vintage and all reflect the
difficulties discussed above. The legal environment is necessarily evolving as nations
struggle with the complexities of global warming. Not surprisingly, many of the
emerging legal rules are frustratingly vague and incomplete.
Preliminary International Consensus-The Framework Convention
In 1988, the United Nations Environmental Programme and the World
Meteorological Organization created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). The IPCC is organized into three working groups that focus respectively on the
science of the climate system, the impacts of climate change and policy options for
response, and the economic and social dimensions of climate change. One of the IPCC’s

10
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first tasks was to assess the scientific, technical and economic basis of climate change
policy in preparation of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, the so-called “Earth Summit” held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. In 1990, the
panel recommended a climate change convention modeled after the Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.15 The goal was to draft a document that would
gain the largest number of adherents. Many of the difficult issues were put aside to be
addressed in subsequent annexes and protocols.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change was one of the landmark
agreements in international environmental law that was adopted at the Earth Summit.
The United States signed the Convention on June 12, 1992, together with 153 other
nations. The United States Senate consented to ratification on October 7, 1992, and
President Bush signed the instrument of ratification on October 13, 1992. The United
States thus became one of the first nations to ratify the Convention. The agreement
entered into force on March 24, 1994, having been ratified by the requisite 50 nations.
Currently, the convention has been ratified by 186 nations.

15

26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987). International efforts to address ozone depletion have been remarkably successful.
The potential role that CFC’s play in ozone depletion was first raised in 1974. The Vienna Convention,
opened for signature in 1985, was a modest document in which the parties agreed to take “appropriate
measures” to prevent ozone depletion and to cooperate in the conduct of research and scientific
assessments. Shortly after the Vienna Convention adjourned, British scientists reported discovery of an
“ozone hole” over Antarctica. Two years later, parties negotiated the Montreal Protocol to the Convention,
and parties agreed to first freeze, and then significantly reduce CFC consumption. As additional
information was generated from research, subsequent Conferences of the Parties further amended the
protocol to first accelerate planned reductions in consumption, and later to ban consumption of some
substances entirely. Additional ozone depleting substances were also identified and made subject to
regulation. The international response to the ozone problem is widely hailed as a triumph of modern
diplomacy, and consequently, it is no surprise that drafters sought to model the Framework Convention on
Climate Change after the Vienna Convention. In many ways, however, ozone depletion was an easier
problem to come to grips with than climate change. First, no one benefits from ozone depletion, although
some are harmed more than others. Second, replacements for CFC’s were soon developed, so economic
impacts of regulation were minimized. Third, production was concentrated in a way that permitted
successful actions in the short run if agreement could be reached among a relatively small number of
parties.
11
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A framework convention sets out general objectives, principles, and commitments
made by parties to the convention, but it lacks the level of detail that will be required to
solve the problem addressed by the agreement. Framework conventions are flexible
documents that are intended to be modified or supplemented by protocols as additional
information becomes available. Ongoing research and regular meetings are typically a
feature of framework conventions.
The general objective of the climate change agreement is to achieve "stabilization
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at the level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be
achieved within the time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to
climate change, to insure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic
development to proceed in a sustainable manner."16 In their actions to achieve the
objective of the convention parties should be guided by five principles: 1) developed
country parties should take the lead in combating climate change;17 2) special
circumstances of developing country parties should be given full consideration;18 3)
parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes
of climate change and mitigate adverse effects;19 4) economic development is essential
for adopting measures to address climate change;20 and 5) measures taken to combat
climate change should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
against or a disguised restriction on international trade.21

16

UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1, art. 2.
Id. art. 3 .1.
18
Id. art. 3 .2.
19
Id. art. 3 .3.
20
Id. art. 3.4.
21
Id. art. 3.5.
17
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The convention divides the parties into three categories: a) all parties; b) Annex I
parties, composed of all industrialized countries; and c) Annex II parties, which consists
of all industrialized countries except the transitioning economies of the former Soviet
Union. All parties to the Framework Convention make ten general commitments which
include mandates to develop national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions by sources
and removals by sinks,22 to formulate and implement national and regional programs
containing measures to mitigate climate change,23 and to promote conservation and
enhancement of sinks and reservoirs.24 Annex I parties made additional commitments.
They include a mandate to adopt national policies and take corresponding measures to
mitigate climate change by limiting anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and by
protecting and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.25 Although no specific
targets were included in the convention, Annex I parties committed to provide detailed
information on their policies and on projected carbon emissions with an aim of returning
to 1990 levels of carbon emissions.26 Finally, Annex II parties agreed to provide new
financial and technical assistance to developing country parties.27
In addition to setting forth the general objectives, principles, and commitments,
the framework convention established an institutional framework to facilitate day-to-day
operations28 and procedures for refining national commitments by the adoption of
protocols or amendments.29

22

Id. art. 4.1 (a).
Id. art. 4.1 (b).
24
Id. art. 4,1 (d).
25
Id. art. 4.2 (a).
26
Id. art. 4.2)(b).
27
Id. arts. 4.3- 4.5.
28
Id. arts. 7-8.
29
Id. arts. 16-17.
23
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The framework convention achieved remarkable international consensus on a
wide variety of issues. First, parties agreed on the need to stabilize the amount of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. To accomplish their goal, there are two choices.
Either man- made emissions of greenhouse gases must be reduced or the ability of the
planet to remove and sequester greenhouse gases from the atmosphere must be enhanced,
or both strategies must be pursued simultaneously. The framework convention
repeatedly recognizes management of emissions, sinks, and reservoirs as crucial to the
successful resolution of climate change issues.30
Second, climate change is a global issue. An increase in carbon sequestration
anywhere on the planet or a reduction in carbon equivalent emissions anywhere on the
planet will have a positive effect on stabilizing the level of greenhouse gasses in the
atmosphere. Consequently, there are many efficiency gains to be achieved from
collective action.
Third, the agreement recognizes that a significant political split exists between
developing countries poised to greatly increase their carbon emissions, and developed
countries whose economies already depend on consumption of fossil fuels. In many
ways this split reflects a fundamental difference of opinion in how the planet's capacity to
absorb greenhouse gases ought to be allocated. Developing countries argue for an
equitable allocation of this capacity;31 some developed countries essentially argue that
capacity has already been allocated under principles of prior appropriation. The
Convention, however, makes it clear that developed countries must take the lead in

30

See, e.g., id. Preamble; arts.3.3; 4.1(b),(d); 4.2 (a)-(c).
What constitutes an equitable allocation is also not free of controversy. An equitable allocation of
absorption capacity might be calculated on a per capita basis, a per acre basis, or on a per unit of GDP
basis.

31
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efforts to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. At the same time,
the convention recognizes that greenhouse gas controls must be adopted with economic
sensitivity. The fact that climate change is a global problem and the resolution of the
problem must proceed in a way that does not destroy the world economy, or individual
national economies, suggests that markets may play a significant role in solutions.
Fourth, the convention recognizes that the impact of implementing response
measures, as well as the impact of anticipated global warming, will vary from nation to
nation. Among the groups of nations facing special problems, the convention identifies
a) small island countries; b) countries with low-lying coastal areas; c) countries with arid
and semiarid areas, forested areas and areas liable to forest decay; d) countries with areas
prone to natural disasters; e) countries with areas liable to drought and desertification; f)
countries with areas of high urban atmosphere pollution; g) countries with areas with
fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems; h) countries whose economies are
highly dependent on income generated from the production, processing and export,
and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy intensive products; and i)
landlocked and transit countries.32
Finally, the convention recognizes that implementation measures must be
developed at national, regional, and local levels. To date, most of the legal activity with
respect to greenhouse gas abatement has been at the international level. The United
States, for instance, does not regulate greenhouse gas emissions.33 In other countries,
however, momentum to minimize greenhouse gas emissions is mounting.

32

UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1, art. 4.8.
Although the United States does regulate emissions of nitrogen oxides and ozone depleting substances,
both are regulated for reasons other than their global warming potential. Carbon dioxide, however, is not
currently regulated as an air pollutant.

33
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Adding Details-The Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change34 was an attempt to enact binding emissions limitations for a group of 38
industrialized nations that are identified in Annex I of the Framework Convention.35
Although the United States signed the Kyoto protocol, it has not been submitted to the
United States Senate for its consent to ratification. In fact, a Senate resolution adopted
without dissent makes it clear that the Senate will not be receptive to a submission in its
current form.36 The protocol remains important, however, because it is the first attempt
to craft detailed commitments within the Framework Convention, and because any future
international efforts are likely to embody many of the principles of the Kyoto agreement.
The limits set out in the Kyoto Protocol apply to emissions of fixed greenhouse gases
measured over the period from 2008 to 2012.37 Annex I parties are required to
demonstrate progress toward meeting commitments by 2005.38 The net changes in
greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks are used to meet
commitments under the protocol.39 In other words, a commitment reduction can be met
34

KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add. 1 (open for signature December 11, 1997, not yet entered into effect).
35
Id. art 3.1. Reduction commitments embodied in the Kyoto protocol are specified in Annex B and range
from a decrease of 8 percent from the 1990 base year levels for most European countries, to an increase of
10 percent over the 1990 levels for Iceland. The United States agreed to reduce its greenhouse emissions
by seven percent from 1990 levels. Id., Annex B.
36
The so-called Byrd-Hagel resolution, Sen. Res. 98, was passed the United States Senate on July 25th
1997 by a 95-0 vote. In the resolution, which had 64 co-sponsors, the Senate states that the United States
should not be a party to any protocol that fails to apply emissions limitations to developing countries as
well as developed countries. It also calls for an economic impact statement to accompany in the
submission of a protocol to the Senate for ratification.
37
Emission limitations contained in the protocol are intended to be met during a five-year commitment
from 2008-2012. KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 29, art. 3.7.
38
Id. art. 3.2.
39
Id. art. 3.3. The Protocol authorizes only a limited number of land use related activities that qualify for
removal credits. They are afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation (a negative removal credit) since
1990. Id. Unfortunately, the terms afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation are not defined in the
Protocol. The Conference of the Parties to the Protocol, however, is authorized to decide on rules and
guidelines that would allow other human induced sink enhancement activities, including removals by
16
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by reducing emissions or by engaging in activities that enhance removals of greenhouse
gasses from the atmosphere by sinks.40
Because greenhouse gas emissions cause global impacts, it does not matter, from
an environmental perspective, where reductions in emissions or removals from sinks
occur. This would suggest that least cost removal and reduction activities should be
pursued without regard to national borders. The protocol contains three market-oriented
mechanisms designed to allow Annex I parties to reduce the cost of complying with
emissions limits, joint implementation,41 a clean development mechanism,42 and
international emissions trading.43 A fourth mechanism, joint fulfillment,44 allows groups
of Annex I parties to enter into agreements that redistribute total reduction commitments
among themselves. The four market oriented mechanisms thus are designed to reduce the
cost of complying with national commitments without loss of any environmental benefits.
Joint fulfillment was initially included in the Protocol to allow the European
Union to redistribute commitment obligations among member states as long as total
emission reduction commitments are satisfied. The effect of joint fulfillment is to place
a bubble over contracting states with compliance satisfied as long as net emissions from
the bubble are within limits specified by the protocol. However, once the joint

agricultural soils and land use changes, to qualify for credits against emission limitation commitments. Id.
art. 3.4. The extent to which nations can claim credit for carbon absorbed by forests and agricultural lands
has been a contentious issue at subsequent Conferences of the Parties, with the issue often pitting the
United States against the European Union. See generally S. Fletcher, RL30692: Global Climate Change 47 (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2001).
40
The goal of the Protocol is to reduce the net discharge of greenhouse gasses to the atmosphere. This can
be accomplished by reducing the direct emission of greenhouse gasses from sources or by engaging in
activities that enhance the ability of sinks to remove greenhouse gasses from the atmosphere. For example,
if a forest were planted where none existed before (afforestation), the net carbon removal from the
atmosphere by the biomass of the trees would be credited against emission reduction commitments.
41
Id. art. 6.
42
Id. art 12.
43
Id. art 17.
44
Id. art. 4.
17
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fulfillment contract is deposited with the Secretariat, the obligations contained in the
contract become binding on individual nations under the protocol.
Joint implementation allows Annex I parties, or authorized legal entities such as
brokers or corporations,45 to transfer to or acquire from other Annex I parties emission
reduction units derived from specific projects designed to reduce emissions or enhance
sinks of greenhouse gases.46 For example, an acquiring party might agree to finance a
project that produces greenhouse gas reduction benefits in exchange for some or all of the
greenhouse gas reduction benefits that can be derived from the project. The precise
allocation of reduction benefits is a matter for contractual allocation among the
participating states. The party acquiring emission reduction units can increase carbon
equivalent emissions above its Kyoto commitments. Similarly, the party transferring
emission reduction commitments must subtract the amount transferred from its allowable
emissions to remain in compliance with Kyoto obligations.
The clean development mechanism authorized by the Protocol parallels joint
implementation described above, except that reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are
achieved by sponsoring projects in non-Annex I countries. The goal of the clean
development mechanism is to promote sustainable development in developing countries
while assisting developed countries in meeting their commitments under the Kyoto
protocol.47 Certified emission reduction units obtained from clean development

45

Id. art.6.3.
Id. art 3.1. The transfer of emission reduction units is contingent on project approval by both parties, on
the project providing reduction or enhancement benefits that otherwise would not occur, and on the
acquiring party being in compliance with other responsibilities under the protocol. The acquisition of
emissions reduction units must also be supplemental to domestic actions taken to comply with the emission
limits specified in the protocol. Id.
47
Id. art. 12.2.
46
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mechanism projects can be used by Annex I parties to help meet their reduction
commitments.48
Emissions trading, in contrast to joint implementation and the clean development
mechanism, is not project based. Rather, it permits parties to buy and sell the right to
emit greenhouse gases.49 For instance, a party in a position to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions at relatively low-cost might undertake projects that generate more reductions
that would be required under the Kyoto obligations. Those excess credits could be sold
to other parties that face greater economic challenges in meeting the Kyoto commitments.
The effect of emissions trading would be to reduce emissions in the selling country below
the level anticipated by the Kyoto agreement or to permit emissions in the purchasing
country to exceed the level anticipated in the Kyoto agreement.
There are many contradictions and unanswered questions in the Kyoto
mechanisms. For example, while legal entities can participate in joint implementation or
clean development projects, it is not clear that they are authorized to engage in emissions
trading. Similarly, the extent to which land use changes and other carbon sink enhancing
activities can serve as the basis for satisfying trade mechanisms varies from mechanism
to mechanism. Removals by sinks are specifically mentioned with respect to joint
implementation in Article 6.50 In contrast, the clean development mechanism authorized
in Article 12 makes no mention of sinks. Articles 6 and 17 provide that transfers of
emission credits must be supplemental to domestic actions taken to meet Annex B

48

Id. art. 12.3(b).
No details of a permissible trading regime were included in the draft of the Protocol. The Protocol
provides that the Conference of the Parties will develop principles, modalities, rules and guidelines. Id. art.
17.
50
Id. art. 6.1.
49
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commitments.51 Similarly, article 12 provides that certified emissions reductions can
only be used to meet part of the protocol commitments.52 With respect to joint
implementation and clean development mechanism projects, parties are required to
demonstrate that the projects produce emissions reductions in excess of those that would
have occurred absent the project.53 Additional unanswered questions included how the
commitments under the protocol are to be enforced, penalties for failure to achieve
commitments, and who bears the risk of nonperformance when part of the nation's
performance depends on reductions generated within the borders of another emission.54
Although these and many other complex issues must be addressed if the
international community is to succeed in stabilizing the concentration of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere, a general outline of the process to be used in regulating
emissions can be discerned. First, caps are placed on net emissions of greenhouse gasses
on a country-by-country basis with the cap based on historical experience. Second,
emissions allowances are the difference between the amount of greenhouse gasses
emitted and any new removals by sinks. Consequently, emissions controls and land use
measures may each be valid ways of achieving emission reduction goals. Third,
emissions allowances may be increased or decreased by a variety of voluntary transfers.
Fourth, precisely how a nation chooses to meet its emissions reductions commitments is a
matter of domestic, not international, law. Finally, and very controversially, emissions
caps have not been placed on developing countries, an issue that makes it unlikely that
the United States will ratify the Protocol unless it is modified.
51

Compare id. art 6.1(d) with art. 17.
Id. art. 12.3(b).
53
Compare id. art. 6.1(b) with art. 12..5(c).
54
For an analysis of the risk of nonperformance, see D. Goldberg, S. Porter, N Lacasta & E. Hillman,
Responsibility for Non-Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol’s Mechanisms for Cooperative
Implementation (Center for International Environmental Law, 1998).
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Kyoto’s Accounting Procedures for Permitted Greenhouse Gas Emissions
To fully appreciate the complexity of the emissions capping mechanism
incorporated into the Kyoto agreement, it is necessary to examine the accounting
procedures in more detail. The Kyoto protocol sets qualified emission limitations for
individual developed countries.55 These limitations are calculated as a percentage of the
emissions that occurred during a base year, generally 1990.56 The United States, for
instance agrees to cap its emissions at 93% of the amount that was emitted in 1990; most
European nations are capped at 92% of the base year emissions.57 Qualified emissions
limitations can be viewed as emission allowances. To give parties time to implement
measures that will permit reductions in emissions, the allowances do not become binding
until the first commitment period, which extends from 2008 to 2012,58 although parties
are expected to demonstrate progress toward meeting the reduction goals by 2005.59 To
provide additional flexibility, parties are given a bulk allocation of allowances during the
five-year commitment period, calculated by multiplying the annual qualified emission
limitation by five.60 This allows a party’s emissions to vary from year to year during the
commitment period without a nation falling out of compliance as long as the total
aggergate amount of emissions allowances are not exceeded during the five year
commitment period. A party can increase its assigned maximum allowance beyond the
qualified emission limitations by securing emission reduction units as part of a joint
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These are set forth on a country-by-country basis in Annex B of the Protocol.
KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 34, art. 3.7. Transitioning economies, notably the nations of the former
Soviet Union, were permitted to select an alternate base year. Id. art. 3.5. Any party can use 1995 as a
base year for certain enumerated tract greenhouse gases. Id. art 3.8.
57
Id., Annex B.
58
Id. art. 3.1. 2008 to 2012 is the first commitment period. By implication, additional commitment periods
with new, and presumably more stringent, reduction goals would follow.
59
Id. art. 3.2.
60
Id. art. 3.7.
56
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implementation project,61 by securing certified emissions from a clean development
mechanism project,62 or by purchasing surplus emission allowances from willing
sellers.63 Conversely, any party transferring emission reduction units as part of a joint
implementation project or any party selling surplus emission allowances will have their
permissible allowances reduced by the amount of the transfer.64 If emissions during the
commitment period are less than a nation’s assigned allowance, the surplus can be carried
forward to future commitment periods.65
Domestic Implementation of International Commitments
Once a nation has committed to capping greenhouse gas emissions at certain
prescribed levels, it must adopt domestic programs to achieve those goals. Apart from
the emissions caps contained in the Kyoto Protocol, Annex 1 Parties have an independent
duty under the Framework Convention to limit emissions of greenhouse gases and protect
and enhance sinks.66 A wide variety of alternative approaches can be hypothesized.
They can be divided into two groups, policies designed to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases and policies designed to protect and enhance sinks.
Policies Designed to Reduce Emissions
Nations have a variety of strategies that they might pursue in attempting to
discourage the emission of greenhouse gases. Because fossil fuel consumption is the
greatest source of greenhouse gas emissions, emissions control strategies will likely be
directed toward the energy sector. Several options are available. A nation might enact a
carbon tax that would be assessed on the basis of carbon emissions. To avoid or
61

Id. art. 3.10.
Id. art. 3.12.
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Id. art. 3.10.
64
Id. art. 3.11.
65
Id. art. 3.13.
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FRAMEWORK CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 4.2(a).
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minimize the tax owed, emitters would have an incentive to switch fuel sources, to
improve efficiency, and to adopt conservation measures. Historically, the United States
has been reluctant to implement pollution taxes.
As an alternative, a nation might adopt technology forcing emissions standards
that would apply to classes and categories of emitters. This is the strategy used in the
United States to control conventional pollutants under the Clean Water Act. A variation
on the theme requires that products manufactured for resale attain certain specified
efficiency standards. Examples include efficiency standards for appliances, water use
standards for toilets, and CAFE standards for automobiles. Closely related to efficiency
standards are command and control regulations that mandate the use of certain
technologies to minimize emissions. Examples could include a requirement that landfills
or large confinement feedlots capture and reuse methane generated from normal
operations. The difficulty with command and control regulations is that they tend to be
inflexible and are often inefficient. At least some command and control regulation,
however, is likely to be a feature of domestic greenhouse gas legislation.
A third alternative approach is a cap and trade system where the emissions of
individual emitters are capped at some level that forces an aggregate decrease in
emissions, but where parties are allowed to trade allowances among themselves. The
United States has had great success with such a program with respect to sulfur dioxide
under the Clean Air Act. To the extent that caps are placed on greenhouse gas emissions
by particular emitters, emissions allowances might be created that can be freely traded
permitting reductions to occur at the least cost. A cap and trade system at the national
level would mirror the system being put in place under the Kyoto Protocol at the
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international level. Given its strong advocacy of market based solutions during
international negotiations, it is likely that a cap and trade system would be a component
of any sophisticated climate change regulatory program adopted in the United States.
Another set of alternatives involves public efforts to make fundamental changes
in the sources of energy used in a country. A nation might choose to invest in or
subsidize the development of energy sources that don't result in significant emissions of
greenhouse gases. Hydropower, nuclear power, and power from various renewable
energy sources such as solar power and wind power would be favored. A nation might
also increase research efforts designed to develop alternative sources of energy such as
hydrogen fuel cells or fusion power.
Finally, a nation might choose to discourage emissions by regulating or taxing
activities that directly or indirectly cause such emissions. For example, a nation might
subsidize mass transit and tax private automobiles. It is likely that most nations would
pursue a variety of approaches in attempting to minimize the emission of greenhouse
gases, although it is too early to anticipate specific programs.67 Given the potential
significant economic impact of controls, particularly carbon controls, it is likely that
nations will search for innovative, cost effective measures.
Policies Designed to Protect and Enhance Sinks
A nation might also attempt to meet its commitments by undertaking activities
that enhance the ability of sinks to remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. Most
of these efforts involve land use choices or restrictions. Historically, in the United States,
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For a summary review of emerging plans from the EU, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Norway, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada see J. Cameron, D. Robertson & P Curnow, Legal &
Regulatory Strategies for GHG Reductions—A Global Survey, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & THE ENVIRON. 176
(2001).
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most land use regulatory decisions have been deemed to be within the purview of state
and local governments, rather than the federal government. Although there would be a
clear constitutional nexus for regulating land uses to achieve greenhouse gas abatement
goals at the federal level, it seems likely that states will play a greater role in such efforts
than they would with respect to emissions policies.
To date, most of the attention regarding enhancement of sinks has been directed
toward forestry practices. That is not surprising because forests have a great potential to
sequester carbon. Nations that are engaged in deforestation by, for instance, converting
forestland to agricultural land, are contributing to the buildup of greenhouse gasses
through their land use policies. Moreover, the Kyoto protocol specifically refers to
deforestation, reforestation, and afforestation, although the terms are not defined.68
Generally, deforestation is the permanent removal of the forest, reforestation is replanting
a forest where one previously existed (or perhaps, in a more limited sense, replanting a
forest immediately after harvest), and afforestation is a change in land use from nonforest to forest. Halsey National Forest would be a clear example of an afforestation
project. A nation might attempt to gain credit for sink enhancing activities by mandating
sustainable forest practices, by subsidizing tree planting efforts, or by regulating or
otherwise discouraging the conversion of forestland to non-forestland.
The Kyoto protocol also recognizes that non-forest related sinks, including other
land use changes and removals by agricultural soils, might also be enhanced in ways that
help stabilize the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.69 Studies suggest that
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Id. art. 3.4.
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agricultural cropland70 and rangeland71 have great potential to sequester carbon. The
United States Department of Agriculture estimates that the total carbon sequestration and
fossil fuel offset potential of U.S. cropland is estimated at 154 million metric tons of
carbon per year or 133% of the total emissions of greenhouse gases by agricultural and
silvicultural activities.72 Policies that might be adopted to enhance the potential of
agriculture to sequester carbon include subsidizing, encouraging, or mandating farming
practices that encourage carbon retention in soils, or by mandating or subsidizing
conservation activities, such as minimum tillage or no tillage, that produce greenhouse
gas abatement benefits.73 Farmers could be compelled to adopt such practices as a
condition of participating in the farm program or they could be encouraged to engage in
such practices as voluntary transactions with emitters who are seeking carbon
sequestration offsets for planned emissions. Additional benefits could be gained from
preventing or discouraging the conversion of prairie lands to croplands. In many cases,
carbon sequestration benefits could be achieved by returning marginally productive lands
to natural uses, such as wildlife habitat, by restoring degraded soils, by preserving
wetlands, and planting windbreaks. A number of existing USDA conservation programs
produce carbon sequestration benefits including the Conservation Reserve Program, the
Wetlands Reserve Program, and the Conservation Buffer Strip Initiative. Land use
measures have two principle advantages as a tool for addressing climate issues. First,
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See R. LAL, J. KIMBLE, R. FOLLETT & C. COLE, THE POTENTIAL OF U.S. CROPLAND TO SEQUESTER
CARBON AND MITIGATE THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT (1999).
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See R. FOLLETT, J. KIMBLE & R. LAL, THE POTENTIAL OF U.S. GRAZING LANDS TO SEQUESTER CARBON
AND MITIGATE THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT (2001).
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Soil Carbon Sequestration: Frequently Asked Questions, USDA Global Change Fact Sheet, USDA
2001.
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In addition to conservation tillage, other beneficial management practices include optimum management
of crop residues and application of manures, soil fertility optimization through site specific management,
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land use measures likely are a least cost alternative to meeting emissions reduction goals,
at least in the short term. Second, land use measures produce synergistic benefits in the
form of enhancing biodiversity, enhancing water quality by reducing runoff and
maintaining wetlands, and preserving landscapes. At the same time, use of sink
enhancements to meet greenhouse abatement goals has been controversial. Some feel
that too liberal use of sinks would make it possible for governments to claim credit for
policies that they would have pursued even in the absence of global warming concerns.
Others raise a series of technical objections.
Technical Objections to Sink Enhancement Projects
Much of the controversy with respect to using sink enhancement projects to
satisfy qualified emission limits revolves around three technical issues.74 First, can the
new volume of greenhouse gasses captured in the sink be accurately measured, a problem
of verifiability. This is a particularly difficult issue where sink enhancement benefits are
claimed for activities in developing countries. Even in developed countries, verification
is a difficult issue, especially for soil sequestration. Even at a national level, it may not
be cost effective to measure sequestration benefits over a period as short as five years if
the stocks are large and the change in stocks is small by comparison,. At the farm level,
stringent measurement requirements might well doom a program.
Second, is sequestration permanent or temporary? For example, planting a forest
might generate sequestration benefits for a number of years. Eventually, however, the
benefits will be lost if the forest is harvested and not replaced. Decomposition of
harvested wood would eventually return stored carbon to the atmosphere. Furthermore,
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The issues are thoroughly discussed in B. Schlamadinger & G. Marland, Forests, Land Management, and
the Kyoto Protocol (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2000).
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even if the forest is replanted, should the new forest be credited with additional
sequestration benefits or should it be deemed carbon neutral, a mere offset to the carbon
loss associated with harvest. The problem is particularly difficult from a regulatory
perspective if the forest enhancement project is located in a developing country not
subject to emissions limitations under the Kyoto protocol. In that case, a developed
nation might claim a clean development mechanism credit for carbon sequestration, but
there would be no mechanism to account for emissions at the time of harvest because
developing countries emissions are not currently limited. A closely related issue
concerns the rate of carbon storage, and the fact that reservoirs such as a forests or
agricultural soils eventually will become saturated with carbon. These concerns suggest
that carbon sequestration may be an appropriate short-term contributor to a greenhouse
gas abatement plan, but not a long run solution to the emissions problem.
Third, how do you prevent a sink enhancement project at one location from
stimulating sink depleting activities at a different location, particularly one within a
different jurisdiction? This problem, known as leakage, is a consequence of the market
altering economic impacts of certain sequestration projects. This is a particular problem
where developing countries currently are subject to no emission limitations under the
Kyoto Protocol. For example, suppose forest preservation measures in one tropical nation
cause the price of tropical hardwoods to increase stimulating harvesting activities in
another country, particularly a country not subject to emissions limits under the Kyoto
regime. Or suppose that returning marginal agricultural soils to conservation uses causes
an increase in farm product prices. This might stimulate conversion of forestland to
agricultural uses in another country.
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A number of issues need to be resolved before carbon sequestration can properly
be accounted for in climate change programs. On the other hand, to ignore the benefits of
sink enhancement is to ignore the fact that substantial amounts of carbon are sequestered
in soil and biomass and that humans can dramatically affect those numbers by the
policies that they adopt. Moreover, sinks are a particularly attractive way of meeting
emission reduction commitments, especially in the short run, because they can often be
implemented at little or no cost and without the need for substantial technological
development.
Potential for Developing Markets for Carbon Sequestration Benefits
The range of possible strategies that a nation might employ to achieve greenhouse
gas reduction commitments is almost limitless. Presumably most nations will pursue
multiple options. The extent to which a nation chooses to rely on voluntary measures to
achieve reduction objectives, including free market transactions, as opposed to command
and control regulations, is largely a matter of public policy. There is little that can be
done by voluntary action that could not be compelled constitutionally by government fiat.
Of course, the advantage of voluntary actions is easier public acceptance and the potential
for greater economic efficiency in achieving environmental goals. At least in the United
States, is likely that any significant greenhouse gas abatement program would incorporate
market mechanisms.
No legal impediments prevent the development of markets for carbon
sequestration benefits. In fact, numerous examples of early attempts to acquire carbon
sequestration offsets or, more often, options for carbon sequestration offsets can be
found. For example, in late 1999, IGF Insurance agreed to sell options for 2.8 million
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tons of carbon dioxide reductions from American agricultural sources to the Greenhouse
Emissions Management Corp, a consortium of major Canadian energy companies.75 In
some cases corporate emitters are positioning themselves to respond to regulation that
they feel will be imposed on them in the near future. In other cases, corporations are
merely responding to the fact that consumers in some countries have demonstrated an
interest in purchasing products that are produced in an environmentally friendly manner,
even if the products are offered at higher prices. Eventually, however, markets will not
flourish unless there is an appropriate legal and institutional infrastructure to support
them.
At a minimum the following structures are probably necessary. First, there must
be an effective way to measure or verify the amount of sequestration benefits that can be
associated with a given activity. The value per acre of carbon sequestration in soils, for
instance, is quite modest. This means that buyers and sellers of carbon offsets will have
to rely on average per acre sequestration benefits. Otherwise, transaction costs would
exceed the value of the bargain. Second, and closely related, there must be a means of
enforcing commitments made in private offset contracts short of litigation. Third, there
must be a means of minimizing transaction costs. One possibility is to pool individual
landholdings for negotiation purposes. The pool could be privately operated through a
broker, organized through a farm organization, or, with an appropriate grant of authority,
organized through a Natural Resources District. Finally, there needs to be some way of
discovering what is a fair market price for a transfer of carbon sequestration credits.
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Currently, carbon markets are in their infancy. It is difficult to determine what the fair
market value of carbon sequestration benefits is. In part, this is because the regulatory
programs that would generate much of the economic value of potential carbon offsets
have not yet been enacted. In part, it is a function of imprecision in measurement of the
amounts of carbon storage that ought to be associated with certain practices. Equally
important, however, is lack of a clearinghouse that reports information on trades.
Individuals, in particular, have little basis to decide whether a particular option contract
for carbon offsets is a good or bad bargain. The fact that the market for carbon
sequestration benefits is clearly an international one both enhances the potential value of
carbon offsets and adds to the complications of determining a fair price. In the final
analysis, the value of carbon offsets will depend on the cost of achieving the same carbon
reduction benefits at any location on the globe.
Conclusion and Policy Considerations
Climate change is a serious problem that will be addressed, though perhaps not
through the Kyoto Protocol. Although very critical of the Kyoto agreement, neither the
President nor the Congress has suggested that climate change is not an issue that merits
immediate attention. The emerging regulatory structure is necessarily proceeding in a top
down manner with the international commitments driving domestic commitments and
domestic commitments eventually impacting on particular firms and individuals. There
is probably little that the state of Nebraska needs to do from a legal perspective to
position itself for coming developments, other than to inventory its resources and monitor
developments. Three possible alternatives might merit further consideration. First, the
legislature might consider granting natural resources districts the power to enter into
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contracts on behalf of landowners and/or the power to ensure enforcement of the
obligations contained in carbon offset contracts or options. Second, the legislature might
consider enacting legislation that requires brokers or others seeking to negotiate carbon
offset or option contracts register with the state, and provide sample contract copies with
the Department of Agriculture or the Department of Natural Resources. Finally, the
legislature or the Governor might want to create a permanent climate change or carbon
sequestration task force to monitor ongoing developments.
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